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ARGUMENT
I.

The More Well Reasoned Interpretation of the Plain Language of
Section 78-14-4(2) is that the Medical Malpractice Two-Year
Statute of Limitations Applies to All Persons, Regardless of Any
Other Provision of Law, Including Section 78-12-35.

The Plaintiffs erroneously claim that Defendant Dr. Grigsby takes no position
regarding the proper interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) in his Brief before this Court.
(Plaintiffs/Appellees' Supreme Court of Utah (SC) Brief, p. 15.) The Plaintiffs include in a
footnote the interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) that was "urged by Dr. Grigsby in the
proceeding below and in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC
Brief, p. 13.) However, in point of fact, Defendant Dr. Grigsby's statutory interpretation of
Section 78-14-4(2) "urged by Dr. Grigsby in the proceeding below and in his Petition for
Writ of Certiorari." and quoted by the Plaintiffs in footnote 4 is the same interpretation that
Defendant Dr. Grigsby continues to advocate in his Brief before this Court. In footnote 4 of
their Brief before this Court, the Plaintiffs quote Defendant Dr. Grigsby's statutory
interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) "urged by Dr. Grigsby in the proceeding below and in
his Petition for Writ of Certiorari.":
To illustrate, in order to make his statutory interpretation to the Court of
Appeals, Dr. Grigsby had to rely on ellipses and bold emphasis to
deemphasize intervening words in the statute. . . . "The provisions of this
section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal
disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law."
(Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, fn. 4, quoting Defendant Dr. Grigsby's/Appellee's Court of
Appeals of Utah (CA) Brief.) However, in his Brief of the Appellant before this Court,
Defendant Dr. Grigsby clearly indicated what he continues to assert is the proper
-1-

interpretation of the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2):
the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) that clearly harmonizes its
provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose is where the
two-year limitation period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority
or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the
law;' including Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35.
(Defendant Dr. Grigsby's/Appellants' SC Brief, pp. 21-22.) Contrary to the Plaintiffs'
assertions, Defendant Dr. Grigsby's discussion in his Brief before this Court that
harmonizes the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2) with the legislative intent of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act manifests a clear position regarding the proper interpretation of
Section 78-14-4(2). Defendant Dr. Grigsby's position as to the proper interpretation of
Section 78-14-4(2) has been consistent and specifically argued before this Court as well as
the Utah Court of Appeals and the trial court. Defendant Dr. Grigsby continues to maintain
that the more well-reasoned interpretation of the plain language of Section 78-14-4 indicates
that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limitations applies to all persons,
regardless of any other provision of law, which contemplates Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35
and includes minority or legal disability under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36.1
The Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Dr. Grigsby's "contention that

defendant Dr. Grigsby is aware that the Utah Supreme Court determined in Lee v.
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1983), that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) is unconstitutional
as applied to minors. However, that decision does not apply to the present case as it is
clear that the Utah Supreme Court confined the unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §
78-14-4(2) only to those circumstances when a minor has been injured. As Ms. Arnold
was not a minor at the time of her alleged injuries, this issue is not before this Court.
Therefore, when Dr. Grigsby discusses the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §78-144(2), it is with the recognition that this Court has already ruled as to the issue of minor's
claims.
-2-

malpractice claims are never subject to tolling under any provision of Utah would require an
awkward and strained reading of the statute's language, and would disregard the structure
and punctuation of the provision." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 13.) In support of
their allegation, the Plaintiffs cite the "last antecedent doctrine":
"Under the last antecedent doctrine, relative and qualifying words, phrases,
and clauses are to be applied to the immediately preceding words or phrases."
(Appellee's Brief, p. 14.) However, the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out the limitations
of the "last antecedent" rule:
Of more plausibility is the County's invocation of the rule of construction
known as the "last antecedent" rule, whereby qualifying words and phrases are
generally regarded as applying to the immediately preceding words, rather
than to more remote ones. We have no doubt of the correctness of that rule of
construction as a generality, if applied in appropriate circumstances. But
helpful as rules of construction often are, they are useful guides, but poor
masters; and they should not be regarded as having any such rigidity as to have
the force of law, or distort an otherwise natural meaning or intent. Their only
legitimate function is to assist in ascertaining the true intent and purpose of the
statute.... An even more fundamental rule of statutory interpretation
helpful here is that the statute should be looked at in its entirety and in
accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished.
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977). (Emphasis added.) The
Plaintiffs ignore the "even more fundamental rule of statutory interpretation . . . . that the
statute should be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was
sought to be accomplished." Id. Looking at the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act "in its
entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished" would
require the Plaintiffs to specifically address the purpose of the Act as expressly described in
Section 78-14-2, which clearly indicates that the "stated purpose of the UHCMA is to

-3-

alleviate health care costs via the establishment of a fixed window of time 'in which
actions may be commenced against health care providers [J while limiting that time to
a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be
reasonably and accurately calculated.'" Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, f 11, 94 P.3d
915. (Emphasis added.) The Plaintiffs fail to provide any substantive discussion of Section
78-14-4(2) in accordance with the purpose of the Act as expressly described in Section 7814-2.2
Similarly, instead of following the "more fundamental rule of statutory
interpretation," the Plaintiffs cite another "maxim of statutory construction that 'expessio
unius est exclusio alterius' - that the expression of one thing is evidence of the exclusion of
the other." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 18.) The Utah Supreme Court has also
pointed out the limitations of this rule of statutory construction:
Reliance is placed upon the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." It
is appreciated that that maxim is sometimes helpful in determining the
meaning of an otherwise questionable statute. But its only usefulness is for
that purpose: as a rule of construction. It has no force of law; and it has no
proper application when its effect would be to obstruct rather than to
carry out the purpose of the statute. It has been aptly said that it is "a
valuable servant, but a dangerous master.11 Whether it is helpful in
understanding the intended effect of a statute depends upon an analysis of the
legislative enactment to which it is sought to be applied.
Rio Grande Motor Way v. Public Serv. Comm% 445 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1968). (Emphasis
added.) It is interesting to note that the Utah Supreme Court expressly indicated that this

2

Significantly the Plaintiffs do not include Section 78-14-2 as a determinative
statute in the "Determinative Statutes and Rules" section of their Brief of Appellees
before this Court or their Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals.
-4-

maxim is "sometimes helpful" when a court must determine the meaning of an "otherwise
questionable statute." Id. However, the Plaintiffs continue to claim that there is nothing
questionable about the meaning of Section 78-14-4(2); therefore, this maxim would not
seem to be helpful according to the Plaintiffs' position. (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p.
13.)
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated that the proper application of such rules of
construction are "to carry out the purpose of the statute." Rio Grande, 445 P.2d at 991.
The Plaintiffs' brief is almost completely devoid of any discussion or any analysis of how
their interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) carries out the purpose of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, as expressly stated in Section 78-14-2. Instead, the Plaintiffs merely
restate the conclusory allegation that "application of the out-of-state tolling statute to
medical malpractice claims does not defeat the purpose of the Act." (Plaintiffs/Appellees'
SC Brief, p. 10.)
The Plaintiffs imply that Dr. Grigsby's interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2)—that the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limitations applies to all claims of all persons,
wherein the phrase "regardless . .. of any other provision of law" is utilized as a general
catchall phrase, which would include Section 78-12-35—would "render[] portions of, or
words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 13,
quoting Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997).) Although the
Plaintiffs fail to provide any direct analysis of how the Utah Supreme Court's statement in
Platts applies to Defendant Dr. Grigsby's interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2), the unstated
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assumption seems to require that the phrase "or any other provision of law" must render as
superfluous the specific statutory reference—minority or legal disability under Section 7812-36—that precedes it. However, an analysis of the phrase "any other provision of law" in
other statutes clearly indicates that the legislature repeatedly utilizes this phrase as a general
catchall phrase, even though, technically, it would render as "superfluous" specific statutory
references that precede it in each of the following sections.
For example, in the "Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act," the
legislature utilized "any other provision of law" as a catchall phrase despite the specific
references that preceded it:
(ii) The approval of an owner or operator under Subsection (4)(c)(i):
(B) does not affect a right that the owner or operator has under:
(I) Title 54, Chapter 8a, Damage to Underground Utility Facilities;
(II) a recorded easement or right-of-way;
(III) the law applicable to prescriptive rights; or
(IV) any other provision of law.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-603(4)(c)(ii). (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the legislature utilized
"or any other provision of law" as a catchall phrase in the Air Conservation Act when
describing the powers of the board despite the specific references that preceded it:
[The board may] consult, upon request, with any person proposing to
construct, install, or otherwise acquire an air contaminant source in the state
concerning the efficacy of any proposed control device, or system for this
source, or the air pollution problem which may be related to the source,
device, or system, but a consultation does not relieve any person from
compliance with this chapter, the rules adopted under it, or any other
provision of law;
Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-104(3)(m). (Emphasis added.) The legislature also utilized "any
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other provision of law" as a catchall phrase in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1212 despite the
specific references that preceded it:
(b) This section does not prevent the obtaining of allegedly pornographic
material or material harmful to minors by purchase, subpoena duces tecum, or
under injunction proceedings as authorized by this act or by any other
provision of law of the state.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1212(5)(b). (Emphasis added.) These other statutes clearly
indicate that "any other provision of law" is often utilized as a legislative catchall phrase and
that interpreting the phrase "or any other provision of law" as a general catchall phrase does
not render the words that precede it, "minority or legal disability under § 78-12-36,"
superfluous or inoperative.
Despite the Plaintiffs' claim to the contrary, Defendant Dr. Grigsby continues to
maintain that the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2) indicates that the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitation applies to all persons, regardless of minority
or legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of law, including the outof-state tolling statute contained in Section 78-12-35. In other words, Defendant Dr.
Grigsby's asserts that the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2) indicates that the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitation applies to all persons' claims,
including minors' claims, legally incompetent individuals' claims, and competent adults'
claims when the defendant physician moves out of state, notwithstanding any other provision
of law.
The fact that the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2) refers to "all persons"
indicates that the legislature intended that the two-year statute of limitations for medical
-7-

malpractice claims applies to all person's claims, including the Plaintiffs'. This
straightforward reading of the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2) was the basis for the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding and the Federal District Court of Utah's holding
that medical malpractice claims are exempt from the general tolling statute. In the medical
malpractice case of Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine Tech, Inc., 2005 WL 223765 (D. Utah)
attached as Exhibit A, the Federal District Court for the District of Utah held that the plain
language of Section 78-14-4(2) "provides an explicit exception to section 78-12-35 by
requiring the two year statute of limitations to apply to 'all persons'":
The Malpractice Act specifically provides that its two-year limitations period
"shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability
under Section 78-12- 36 or any other provision of the l a w . . . . " Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-4(2). As the Utah Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he Utah
Legislature has demonstrated that if it seeks specifically to exempt a statute
from the tolling statute, it will do so with clear, explicit language." Bonneville
Asphalt v. Labor Comm % 91 P.3d 849, 852 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Because
the Malpractice Act provides an explicit exception to section 78-12-35 by
requiring the two year statute of limitations to apply to "all persons," section
78-12-35 does not apply in medical malpractice cases.
Id. at 4. (Emphasis added.) The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that federal
district court's interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2):
The district court held that medical malpractice actions were excepted from
the tolling provision of § 78-12-25 because under § 78-14-4(2) the two-year
statute of limitation period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority
or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the
law." The court held that this provision was an "explicit exception to section
78-12-35" and that the limitations period was not tolled during [defendant's]
absences. We agree.
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine Tech} Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3607 (10th Cir.) attached
as Exhibit B (emphasis in original.)
-8-

On the other hand, the Utah Court of Appeals interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2)
would "render[] portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative." Platts, 947
P.2d at 662. Although Section 78-14-4(2) specifically states that the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations shall apply to "all persons," the Utah Court of
Appeals' interpretation effectively renders the term "all persons" inoperative by claiming
that the statute of limitations applies to minors and legally incompetent adults but not to
competent adults when the defendant physician moves out of state.3 In other words, the
Utah Court of Appeals' holding requires an interpretation that the Utah legislature singled
out minors' and mentally incompetent individuals' medical malpractice claims for tolling
preclusion, while allowing a competent adult's claims to be tolled indefinitely if the
physician happens to move out of state, despite the fact that the physician would still be
subject to service of process under Utah's long-arm statute. According to the Plaintiffs, the
Utah Court of Appeals interpretation is "the only reasonable interpretation." (Appellees'
Brief, p. 12.) However, "all persons" should apply to all persons, including the Plaintiffs.
Dr. Grigsby maintains that is the more reasonable interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2), and
other credible courts have agreed.
II.

Whether Section 78-14-4(2) Can Reasonably Be Characterized as
Ambiguous, This Court Still Needs to Interpret Its Provisions in
Harmony with Other Statutes in the Same Chapter and Related
Chapters.

The Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Dr. Grigsby's position-that Utah Code Ann. §
3

Recognizing that the application of Section 78-14-4(2) to minors has already been
determined by the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah
1983), see footnote 1 supra.
-9-

78-14-4(2) is ambiguous as this statutory section has been understood by four different
courts to have more than one meaning— as set forth in his Brief of Appellants to this Court
is "an about face from his position in the lower courts." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p.
13.) However, this is now an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Utah, not
the trial court. As the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out, "On certiorari, we review the
decision of the court of appeals, not the trial court." John Holmes Constr., Inc. v. R.A.
McKell Excavating, Inc., 2005 UT 83, U 6, 131 P.3d 199. The mere fact that Defendant Dr.
Grigsby has acknowledged that the Utah Court of Appeals understood Section 78-14-4(2) to
have a different meaning than other courts, and therefore this statute can reasonably be
characterized as ambiguous is not an "about face" from Dr. Grigsby's position in the lower
courts. Instead, Defendant Dr. Grigsby maintains that his present position merely provides
the appropriate deference to the opinions of the trial court, the Utah Court of Appeals, the
the Federal District Court of Utah, and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
However, despite these courts' differing interpretations, the Plaintiffs continue to
assert that there is only one "reasonable interpretation of Section 78-14-4."
(Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 12.) The Plaintiffs allege that the interpretation of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Federal District Court of Utah are unreasonable.
(Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 15.) However, Utah courts have indicated:
A statute is ambiguous if it can be understood by reasonably well-informed
persons to have different meanings.
Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). (Emphasis added.) It
is Dr. Grigsby's position that jurists of the Utah Court of Appeals and the Tenth Circuit
-10-

Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court and the Federal District Court of Utah, qualify as
"reasonably well-informed persons" who have understood Section 78-14-4(2) to have
different meanings. Giving these jurists the proper deference they warrant, it seems a bit
dismissive for the Plaintiffs to claim that there is only one "reasonable interpretation of
Section 78-14-4(2)." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 13.)
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "if we find a provision ambiguous, which
causes doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning or application, we must analyze the act in its
entirety and 'harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and
purpose.'" Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 185 (Utah 1998). However, whether Section 7814-4(2) is ambiguous is not the central issue to this Court's analysis as the same approach to
interpreting its statutory construction would be followed regardless of ambiguity. The Utah
Supreme Court has pointed out:
When interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the statute's plain language
to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose. Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch.
Dist., 2002 UT 130, P 21, 63 P.3d 705. We read the plain language of the
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. State v. Schofield, 2002
UT 132, P 8, 63 P.3d 667; State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, P 54, 63 P.3d 621
(Regarding "whole statute" interpretation, the court stated: "'A statute is
passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general
purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in
connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious
whole.'" (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction §
96:05 (4th ed. 1984))). We follow "'the cardinal rule that the general
purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the
parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest
object.5" Faux v. Mickelsen, 725 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah 1986) (quoting
Sutherland, supra, § 46:05).
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, % 17 (Utah 2003). (Emphasis added.) Therefore, whether
-11-

this Court finds Section 78-14-4(2) to be ambiguous, it still needs to "read the plain
language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes
in the same chapter and related chapters." Id. Such a harmonizing approach is clearly
warranted when interpreting Section 78-14-4(2) as the purpose of the Act is clearly
expressed in the same chapter in Section 78-14-2. The Utah Supreme Court has already
indicated that "we ha[ve] no need to speculate as to what purposes the Malpractice Act was
intended to serve because the purposes were set forth in § 78-14-2." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d
572, 580 (Utah 1993). {See also Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 30, 31-32
(Utah 1981) ("The avowed legislative purpose for treating the class of health providers
differently from other defendants is stated in the Act itself."))
The Utah Court of Appeals stated that the trial court "astutely analyzed the issue" of
whether the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitations, set forth in
Section 78-14-4, was subject to the general statutory tolling provision of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-35. Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, \ 14, 180 P.3d 188. However, the trial
court's analysis of Section 78-14-4 failed to "interpret its provisions in harmony with other
statutes in the same chapter." The trial court's analysis is completely devoid of any mention
of other statutes in the same chapter, in particular Section 78-14-2, when concluding that
"the language 'or any other provision of the law' refers only to other provisions of the law
which define iegal disability'":
[I]t is clear to the Court that the language "or any other provision of the law"
refers only to other provisions of the law which define "legal disability." This
reading is supported by the fact that this language is contained within a
dependent clause which refers back to, and clarifies the meaning of, the term
-12-

"all persons." The clause "regardless of minority or other legal disability under
Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of [the] law" is contained within a
single set of commas, indicating to this Court that the legislature intended the
clause to refer to party status, rather than to removing this provision from the
scope of all other provisions of law.
Arnold, 2008 UT App 58,1j 14, quoting trial court's November 21, 2005 Order. Contrary to
these findings, the trial court's analysis of Section 78-14-4(2) fails to "read the plain
language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes
in the same chapter."
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals provided minimal discussion of the legislative
intent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act when it said:
Dr. Grigsby further argues that interpreting section 78-14-4(2) as not
preventing the application of section 78-12-35 to medical malpractice actions
is contrary to the declared purpose of the Malpractice Act, as set forth in Utah
Code section 78-14-2. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (2002). That section
declares:
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced
against health care providers while limiting that time to a
specific period for which professional liability insurance
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation
and settlement of claims.
Id. We conclude, however, that our interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) is not
contrary to the purpose of the act, as it still substantially limits the statute of
limitations period for malpractice actions and still provides the needed
predictability for insurance companies in the vast majority of cases.
Id. at f 19. Not being "contrary" to the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is
not the same as construing Section 78-14-4 in connection with Section 78-14-2 "so as to
produce a harmonious whole." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, P 54, 63 P.3d 621. The
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Utah Court of Appeals, like the trial court, failed to follow "'the cardinal rule that the
general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts be
interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object.'" Faux v. Mickelsen, 725
P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah 1986) (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland, Statutory
Construction § 46:05 (4th ed. 1984))).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the connection between Section 78-14-2 and
78-14-4, implicitly acknowledging the need to harmonize these two sections, although it
made an exception for minors:
The stated purpose of the Malpractice Act was to curb rising malpractice
insurance rates, ensure, the availability of malpractice insurance, and reduce
the cost of health care. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. The Act sought to
accomplish these objectives, inter alia, by subjecting the malpractice
claims of all persons, including minors, to a shorter statute of limitations
than the four-year statute of limitations applicable to most other
negligence actions and by abolishing all malpractice causes of action not filed
within four years of the act of malpractice.
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1993). Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court pointed
out the interconnectedness between Section 78-14-2 and 78-14-4 in Dowling v. Bullen, 2004
UT 50, % 11, 94 P.3d 915, indicating that the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act is to ease health care costs, as stated in Section 78-14-2, by establishing a specific
window of time to bring malpractice actions in Section 78-14-4:
However, the stated purpose of the UHCMA is to alleviate health care costs
via the establishment of a fixed window of time "in which actions may be
commenced against health care providers [,] while limiting that time to a
specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be
reasonably and accurately calculated."
Id. Despite the Utah Court of Appeals' unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, indefinitely
-14-

tolling claims against a health care provider who moves out of Utah to practice health care
elsewhere clearly defeats the purpose of "limiting that time to a specific period for which
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated." Id.
It is impossible for an insurance company to estimate or calculate how long a health care
provider may remain out of state.
It is difficult to understand how allowing a malpractice claim against physicians, who
move from Utah to seek employment in another state, to be tolled for as long as the
physician remains employed in another state "still substantially limits the statute of
limitations." Arnold, 2008 UT App 58 at ^f 19. Tolling a medical malpractice claim for an
indefinite period of time does not limit the statute of limitations in any meaningful way. The
Utah Supreme Court has previously pointed out that allowing an action to be commenced
10, 20, or any indeterminate number of years after its origin does not harmonize with
providing a definite limitation of time in which it must be brought:
Under the interpretation and application of our statute contended for by the
plaintiff, that the defendants' absence from the state tolled the running of the
statute of limitations, an action against a nonresident motorist would
practically never be outlawed. A purported claim could rest in suspense and an
action could be commenced 10, 20 or any number of years after its origin,
even though the plaintiff could have sued and served process any time he
desired. It seems to us that such a result would comport with neither reason
nor justice. Nor would it harmonize with the policy of the law of allowing
a reasonable time for the bringing of an action, but of providing a definite
limitation of time in which it must be brought or the matter put at rest.
Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 256 (Utah 1964). (Emphasis added.) The Utah Court of
Appeals' interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) also does not harmonize with the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act's purpose of "alleviatfing] health care costs via the establishment of a
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fixed window of time 'in which actions may be commenced against health care providers.555
Bowling, 2004 UT 50 at % 11.
Similarly, it is equally unclear how the tolling a medical malpractice claim for an
indefinite period of time "provides the needed predictability for insurance companies in the
vast majority of cases,55 as the Utah Court of Appeals claims, when, according to the U.S.
Census Bureau, 1 in 6 Americans move each year, and approximately 17% of those
Americans will move out of state.4 The average American moves 11.7 times during his or
her lifetime.5 Given the mobility of modem society, tolling the medical malpractice's
abbreviated statute of limitations when a physician moves out of state to practice elsewhere
does not provide the needed predictability for insurance companies and, indeed, is contrary
to the stated purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
The clearly stated legislative intent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to
treat medical malpractice claims different from other claims. The legislature's expressed
intent in enacting the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was to limit the time for bringing a
malpractice action to a specific period of time for all claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-142. In the medical malpractice context, the abbreviated two-year statute of limitations applies
to all persons regardless of any other provision of the law, including general tolling statutes.
The Utah Court of Appeals5 interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) failed to follow "the
cardinal rule" that "the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control55 and
4

http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/geomob.html, visited on
September 10, 2008.
5

Id.
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Section 78-14-4(2) shall "be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest
object." Faux, 725 P.2d at 1375.
III.

The Reasoning from the United State Supreme Court's Holding in Bendix and
from Other Jurisdictions Indicates That the Court of Appeals' Interpretation of
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-14-4(2) Would Negatively Impact Commerce and is
Contrary to the Legislative Purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act;
In Addition, Courts Should Avoid Statutory Interpretations That Promote
Unconstitutional Infirmity.
In Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court

pointed out "that when exercising our certiorari jurisdiction granted by section 78-2-2(3)(a),
we review a decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial court. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)(a). Therefore, the briefs of the parties should address the decision of the court
of appeals." (Emphasis added.) The Utah Court of Appeals claimed that its interpretation
of Section 78-14-4(2) is not contrary to the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
because "our interpretation should not cause malpractice insurance rates to increase and will
not deter healthcare providers from leaving Utah." Arnold, 2008 UT App 58, If 19.
Defendant Dr. Grigsby's Brief before this Court directly addressed this particular claim of
the Utah Court of Appeals.
The claim of the Utah Court of Appeals that "our interpretation should not cause
malpractice insurance rates to increase and will not deter healthcare providers from leaving
Utah" clearly implicates interstate commerce. Id. The court in Tesar v. Hallas, 738 F.
Supp. 240, 241-242 (N.D. Ohio 1990) clarified:
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue two and a half score
years ago, and held that "the movement of persons falls within .. . the
Commerce Clause." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172, 86 L. Ed. 119,
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62 S. Ct. 164 (1941). Courts since then have followed suit, holding that
interstate commerce is affected when persons move between states in the
course of or in search for employment.
As the Tesar court pointed out, "interstate commerce is affected when persons move
between states in the course of or in search for employment." Id. Therefore, claim of the
Utah Court of Appeals that "our interpretation . . . will not deter healthcare providers from
leaving Utah" clearly implicates interstate commerce. Arnold, 2008 UT App 58 at \ 19.
The Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Grigsby's discussion of the impact of the Utah Court of
Appeal's interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) on interstate commerce is "merely a
roundabout way of arguing that the out-of-state tolling statute violates the dormant
commerce clause of the United States Constitution." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 23.)
However, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly indicated that "the briefs of the parties should
address the decision of the court of appeals." Butterfield,831 P.2d at 101. The fact that the
Utah Court of Appeals' decision may have constitutional implications should not improperly
limit the parties ability to fully address the court's decision.
The only basis that the Utah Court of Appeals provides for the claim that its
interpretation will not impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce is the
unsupported conclusion that "all medical providers need do to make sure the statute of
limitations is not tolled if they leave Utah is appoint an agent within Utah to receive service
of process for them."6 Arnold, 2008 UT App 58 at Tf 19. Neither the Plaintiffs nor the trial
6

The Plaintiffs allege that "[t]here is no need for a statutory procedure authorizing
a person to appoint an agent for limited purposes; the law already affords individuals that
ability." (Plaintiffs/Appellees/ Brief, p. 23.) However, the Plaintiffs fail to provide any
specific information as to how the ability afforded by the law translates into a procedure
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court made such an argument. The Plaintiffs merely point out the immaterial fact that the
"Court of Appeals adopted the very same interpretation of the statute as the trial court, and
that the Arnolds urged on appeal." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 23.) The material
difference is that neither the trial court nor the Plaintiffs have discussed or analyzed whether
their interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) "is contrary to the declared purpose of the
Malpractice Act, as set forth in Utah Code section 78-14-2." Arnold, 2008 UT App 58, f 19.
Section 78-14-2 is never cited nor indirectly mentioned in either opinion of the trial court or
any of the briefs or memoranda filed by the Plaintiffs before the trial court or the Utah Court
of Appeals despite having been raised by Dr. Grigsby.
Dr. Grigsby's primary point on appeal is that its interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2)
is the more well reasoned one because it is in harmony with the purpose of the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act as expressly stated in section 78-14-2. On the other hand, the Utah
Court of Appeals claims that its interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) is not contrary to the
purpose of the Act as expressed in Section 78-14-2:
We conclude, however, that our interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) is not
contrary to the purpose of the act, as it still substantially limits the statute of
limitations period for malpractice actions and still provides the needed
predictability for insurance companies in the vast majority of cases. Moreover,
our interpretation should not cause malpractice insurance rates to increase and
will not deter healthcare providers from leaving Utah.
Arnold, 2008 UT App 58 at f 19. Dr. Grigsby has provided this Court with persuasive
that allows an individual to register an appointed agent with the State. Dr. Grigsby was
unable to find any readily apparent mechanism for registering an appointed agent with the
State for limited purposes on the Utah Court's online page, "Finding People for Service
of Process," http://www.utcourts.gov/howto/service/finding_people.html, or anywhere
else on the Internet.
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authority directly on point as to the incorrectness of the claims of the Utah Court of Appeals.
However, the Plaintiffs decline to discuss the merits of any of the cited authority. For
example, the Plaintiffs decline to discuss the merits of the persuasive authority found in
Mcfadden v. Battifora, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 595, 14-15 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004),
attached as Exhibit C, that:
There is no sound basis for imposing a burden on him that would not have
been imposed had he remained a California resident, or forcing him to choose
between a new job in a different state and unlimited exposure to litigation
arising from his work in California.
Similarly, the Plaintiffs decline to discuss the merits of the persuasive authority found in
Tesar v. Hollas, 738 F. Supp. 240, 242 (N.D. Ohio 1990) that "it seems plainly
'unreasonable' for persons who have committed acts they know might be considered
tortious to be held hostage until the applicable limitations period expires."
The Plaintiffs repeatedly claim that the Utah Court of Appeals is the "only reasonable
interpretation of Section 78-14-4," but they decline to directly discuss whether the Utah
Court of Appeals' interpretation is reasonable given the purpose of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, as expressly stated in Section 78-14-2. Instead of directly responding to
the persuasive authority cited by Defendant Dr. Grigsby in Sections C and D of his Brief
before this Court, the Plaintiffs attempt to curtail any discussion or analysis of this
persuasive authority by stating that "a party may not raise issues for the first time on
appeal." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 23.) However, directly addressing the decision
of the Utah Court of Appeals does not constitute raising an issue for the first time on appeal.
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In fact, the Court of Appeals' brief discussion of Section 78-14-2 was in direct
response to the issue raised directly by Defendant Dr. Grigsby as to whether the
interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) is in harmony with the legislative purpose found in
Section 78-14-2:
Dr. Grigsby further argues that interpreting section 78-14-4(2) as not
preventing the application of section 78-12-35 to medical malpractice
actions is contrary to the declared purpose of the Malpractice Act, as set
forth in Utah Code section 78-14-2.... We conclude, however, that our
interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) is not contrary to the purpose of the act, as
it still substantially limits the statute of limitations period for malpractice
actions and still provides the needed predictability for insurance companies in
the vast majority of cases. Moreover, our interpretation should not cause
malpractice insurance rates to increase and will not deter healthcare providers
from leaving Utah.... all medical providers need do to make sure the statute
of limitations is not tolled if they leave Utah is appoint an agent within Utah to
receive service of process for them.
Pirnold, 2008 UT App 58 at ^f 19. (Emphasis added.) The point of this appeal is to address
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Despite the Utah Court of Appeals' claim that its interpretation of section 78-14-4(2)
will "not cause malpractice insurance rates to increase and will not deter healthcare
providers from leaving Utah" because Dr. Grigsby merely needed to appoint an agent within
Utah to receive service of process for him to toll the statute of limitations, the United States
Supreme Court has directly rejected such claims in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988), and its progeny. The Court pointed out:
The suggestion that Midwesco had the simple alternatives of
designating an agent for service of process in its contract with Bendix
or tendering an agency appointment to the Ohio Secretary of State is
not persuasive. . . . As we have already concluded, this exaction is an
unreasonable burden on commerce.
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Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 894-895 (U.S. 1988).
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the purpose of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act is clearly related to commerce: "the purpose of the UHCMA is to alleviate
health care costs." Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, \ 10, 94 p.3d 915. Therefore, it is
clearly appropriate to address whether the Utah Court of Appeals' s interpretation of Section
78-14-4(2) will place an "unreasonable burden on commerce" that would undermine the
express purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The United State Supreme
Court's holding in Bendix clearly represents persuasive authority on this issue without
analyzing the constitutional implications of the application of Section 78-15-35 on
physicians who leave the state to seek employment elsewhere.
The Utah Court of Appeals has indicated that the reasoning in United States Supreme
Court decisions can be persuasive. In Merrill v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 UT App 214, \ 18,
163 P.3d 741, the Court of Appeals indicated, "We find the reasoning from the United
States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions helpful, and the analysis in treatises
persuasive." The reasoning from the United States Supreme Court in Bendix and from other
jurisdictions is helpful in addressing whether the Utah Court of Appeals's interpretation of
Section 78-14-4(2) is reasonable given the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
as expressly stated in Section 78-14-2.
Although the issue of whether the tolling statute, Section 78-12-35, unconstitutionally
violates the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution is not before this
Court, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bendix, and its progeny, underscore the
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potential constitutional infirmities of the Utah Court of Appeals5 interpretation of Section
78-14-4. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bendix, and its
progeny, is consistent with the legislative intent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,
which clearly addresses the commercial impact of health care malpractice claims, and points
to Dr. Grigsby's interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) as being more well reasoned. The
Utah Supreme Court has stated, "we have "a duty to construe a statute whenever possible so
as to effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or
infirmities."' State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). This Court should construe the
statutory phrase, "or any other provision of law," so as to avoid any conflict with the
Commerce Clause and to harmonize with the stated purpose of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant/Appellant Dr. Grigsby respectfully
requests that the Utah Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals
and determine that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 is not subject to tolling under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-35 and uphold the summary judgment of the trial court.
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LEXSEE 2005 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 46290
VALERIE ANN GRIFFITHS-RAST, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. SULZER SPINE
TECH, INC., a Minnesota Corporation; and PRAVEEN PRASAD, M.D.,
Defendants.
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[*1] Valerie Ann Griffiths-Rast, an
individual, Plaintiff, Pro se, SALT LAKE CITY, UT.
For Valerie Ann Griffiths-Rast, an individual, Plaintiff:
D. Bruce Oliver, LEAD ATTORNEY, SALT LAKE
CITY,UT.
For Sulzer Spine Tech, a Minnesota Corporation, also
known as Zimmer Spine, Defendant: Rick L. Rose,
LEAD ATTORNEY, Kristine M. Larsen, RAY
QUINNEY & NEBEKER (SLC), SALT LAKE CITY,
UT; Andrea Michelle Roberts, Thomas G. Stayton,
BAKER & DANIELS (IND), INDIANAPOLIS, IN.
For Praveen G. Prasad, an individual, Defendant:
Christian W. Nelson, LEAD ATTORNEY, P. Keith
Nelson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Brandon B. Hobbs,
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON, SALT
LAKE CITY, UT.
JUDGES: DALE A. KIMBALL, United States District
Judge.
OPINION BY: DALE A. KIMBALL
OPINION
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendants'
motions for summary judgment on the grounds that
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statutes of
limitation. A hearing on the motions was held on
September 8, 2005. At the hearing, Plaintiff Valerie Ann
Griffiths-Rast ("Ms. Griffiths-Rast") was represented by

D. Bruce Oliver. Defendant Praveen Prasad, M.D. ("Dr.
Prasad") was represented by Brandon Hobbs, and
Defendant Sulzer Spine Tech, Inc. ("Sulzer Spine") [*2]
1
was represented by Andrea Roberts. Before the hearing,
the court carefully considered the memoranda and other
materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the
motions under advisement, the court has further
considered the law and facts relating to the motions. Now
being fully advised, the court enters the following
Memorandum Decision and Order.
1 Sulzer Spine refers to itself in its memoranda
as "Zimmer Spine, Inc." However, for purposes
of this Memorandum Decision and Order, it will
be referred to as "Sulzer Spine."

I. BACKGROUND
The court finds that the following facts are
undisputed. Ms. Griffiths-Rast sustained a back injury at
work in February 1997. She was referred to Dr. Prasad
by her Worker's Compensation carrier. In August 1997,
after reviewing Ms. Griffiths-Rast's MRI scan, Dr.
Prasad originally recommended physical therapy;
however, during a follow-up visit on March 19, 1998, Dr.
Prasad suggested that she undergo a surgical procedure,
the BAK Cage implantation, to address her ongoing back
pain. The BAK Cage is an interbody fusion device
manufactured by Sulzer Spine. Ms. Griffiths-Rast stated
that prior to her March 19 visit with Dr. Prasad, she was
doing better in physical [*3] therapy and able to lift
seventy pounds, but she still had residual pain after
physical therapy. She also indicated that Dr. Prasad told
her with the surgery she had a ninety-five percent chance
of going back to work after a six month healing process.
Dr. Prasad performed the surgery on August 3, 1998.
Prior to surgery, Ms. Griffiths-Rast signed a consent
form that authorized Dr. Prasad to perform the surgery,
and it identified the name of device to be implanted in
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her spine. Following the surgery, Ms. Griffiths-Rast
experienced complications and remained in the hospital
for twelve days.

IL DISCUSSION

During her deposition, Ms. Griffiths-Rast indicated
that she was aware of a problem with the BAK Cage
implantation immediately after the surgery during her
hospital recovery. When asked if she "felt like there was
a problem with the cage implantation" and "with what
Dr. Prasad did," she answered affirmatively and further
testified that "[everything went wrong." She also
indicated that she attributed the pain she experienced
after surgery "to something Dr. Prasad did or didn't do
during the procedure" or "to some problem with the . . .
cage device." Ms. Griffiths-Rast stated that she retained
counsel [*4] a couple of weeks after her surgery "[w]hen
[she] wasn't getting any better."

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate when
the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The movant bears an initial burden to
demonstrate an absence of evidence to support an
essential element of the non-movant's case. If the movant
carries [*6] this initial burden, the burden then shifts to
the non-movant to make a showing sufficient to establish
that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
existence of that element. See Celotex Corp, v. Catrett,
477 U.S, 317, 324, 106 S, Ct, 2548, 91 L, Ed 2d 265
(1986).

On November 10, 1998, Ms. Griffiths-Rast received
an SI injection from a doctor at Parkview Radiology who
informed her that "there was a healing defect on the left
side of [the] cage." Ms. Griffiths-Rast admits in her
response to Dr. Prasad's motion for summary judgment
that the earliest point where she could reasonably be
aware of medical malpractice was during this visit to
Parkview Radiology.
On November 26,2001, Dr. Prasad was deposed in a
case against another patient. During that deposition, Dr.
Prasad indicated that he had moved out of Utah in
September 2000. Dr. Prasad also intimated that while he
was on Sulzer Spine's advisory board from 1998 to 2000,
lie may have periodically been out of the state teaching
the BAK Cage procedure to his peers around the country.
Also on November 26, 2001, Ms. Griffiths-Rast
served Dr. Prasad a Notice of Intent to Commence
Action ("Notice") as required by the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (2002)
("No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the
prospective defendant or his [*5] executor or successor,
at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence
an action."). Ms. Griffiths-Rast further claims that she
did not discover the name of the manufacturer of the
BAK Cage until a meeting with Dr. Prasad on October 4,
2002.
On November 26, 2002, a year after serving Dr.
Prasad Notice, Ms. Griffiths-Rast filed a complaint
against both Dr. Prasad and Sulzer Spine alleging
medical malpractice and products liability respectively.
On January 30, 2003, Ms. Griffiths-Rast filed an
amended complaint to include certain factual allegations
but her claims against both Dr. Prasad and Sulzer Spine
remained the same. However, she did not serve Sulzer
Spine with the amended complaint until February 11,
2004.

1. Standard of Review

The non-movant "must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 a.S, 574, 586, 106 S. Ct 1348, 89 L. Ed 2d
538 (1986). While the non-movant is entitled to the
benefit of whatever reasonable inferences there are in its
favor, the reasonableness of those inferences is
scrutinized in light of the undisputed facts. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 a.S 242, 256, 106 S Ct. 2505,
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), A genuine dispute exists only if
"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 a.S, at
248. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there is no genuine issue of material
fact." Anderson, 477 a.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in
original).
2. Dr. Prasad's Motion
Dr. Prasad argues [*7] that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's
claims against him are barred by the Utah Healthcare
Malpractice Act ("Malpractice Act") which provides that
"[n]o malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injury, whichever occurs first." Utah Code Ann. § 78-144(1) (2002). The discovery of a legal injury occurs "when
the injured person knew or should have known of an
injury and that the injury was caused by a negligent act."
Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, 984 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah
1999). Furthermore, '"[d]iscovery of a legal injury,
therefore, encompasses both awareness of physical injury
and knowledge that the injury is or may be attributable
to negligence.'" Id. (quoting Chapman v. Primary
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1989)).
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Because Ms. Griffiths-Rast served Dr. Prasad with
Notice on November 26,2001, she must have necessarily
discovered her legal injury on or after November 26,
1999 in order to pursue her claim. However, Dr. Prasad
asserts that at Ms. Griffiths-Rast's deposition she
admitted to discovering her injury immediately [*8] after
surgery, which was on August 3, 1998, and thus well
before November 26, 1999. Dr. Prasad further asserts
that the latest possible date on which Ms. Griffiths-Rast
discovered or should have discovered her legal injury
was November 10, 1998 when a doctor at Parkview
Radiology informed her of a "healing defect on the left
side of [the] cage." Accordingly, Dr. Prasad concludes
that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claims are barred by the
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations whether her cause
of action accrued in August 1998 or in November 1998
because she served Notice well after the limitations
period expired for either date.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast concedes that the earliest she
could have discovered her legal injury was November 10,
1998. However, she argues that Dr. Prasad's absence
from Utah in September 2000 and his periodic absences
between 1998 and 2000 tolled the two-year statute of
limitations under Utah Code section 78-12-35. This
statute provides:
Where a cause of action accrues against
a person when he is out of the state, the
action may be commenced within the term
as limited by this chapter after his return
to the state. If after a cause of action
accrues he departs from the state, [*9] the
time of his absence is not part of the time
limited for the commencement of the
action.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Ms. Griffiths-Rast
concludes that the time between September 2000, when
Dr. Prasad left Utah, and November 26, 2001, when he
was served with Notice, should not be computed against
her. She also requests further discovery pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) in order to
establish other periods of time Dr. Prasad was absent
from Utah during 1998 to 2000.
However, the court agrees with Dr. Prasad's
argument that section 78-12-35 is inapplicable to toll the
statute of limitations. The Malpractice Act specifically
provides that its two-year limitations period "shall apply
to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal
disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision
of the law
" Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2). As the
Utah Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he Utah
Legislature has demonstrated that if it seeks specifically
to exempt a statute from the tolling statute, it will do so

with clear, explicit language." Bonneville Asphalt v.
Labor Comm'n, 91 P.3d 849, 852, 2004 UT App 137
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). Because the Malpractice Act
provides an explicit exception [*10] to section 78-12-35
by requiring the two year statute of limitations to apply
to "all persons," section 78-12-35 does not apply in
medical malpractice cases. 2 Thus, Ms. Griffiths-Rast's
claim against Dr. Prasad was not tolled. Therefore,
whether Ms. Griffiths-Rast discovered or should have
discovered her legal injury in August 1998 or November
10, 1998 is immaterial because both dates are well before
the date she served Dr. Prasad Notice on November 26,
1999. Accordingly, Dr. Prasad's motion for summary
judgment is granted.
2 However, the Utah Supreme Court in Lee v.
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), held that
section 78-14-4(2) is unconstitutional as applied
to minors because they have no standing to
commence a lawsuit before they reach majority.
See id. at 579. That reasoning is not applicable in
the instant case because Ms. Griffiths-Rast was
not a minor when her cause of action accrued.
3. Sulzer Spine's Motion
Sulzer Spine asserts that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claims
are barred by the Utah Product Liability Act's ("UPLA")
statute of limitations, which provides that a plaintiff must
commence a product liability claim within two years of
the date that plaintiff "discovered, or in the exercise
[*11] of due diligence should have discovered, both the
harm and its cause." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3. The
harm is the physical injury or illness suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's conduct. McKinnon
v. Tambrands, Inc., 815 F. Supp 415, 418 (D. Utah
1993). In Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d
250 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals
interpreted the phrase "and its cause" to mean that the
limitations period did not begin to run "until the plaintiff
discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence should have
discovered, the identity of the manufacturer." Id. at 253.
The court "reasoned that lacking such information, a
plaintiff could not know the cause of his or her injury."
Bank One Utah, N.A. v. West Jordan City, 54 P.3d 135,
2002 UT App 271 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (discussing
Aragon and distinguishing the differences between the
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations and the UPLA's
statute of limitations). Relying on this language from
Aragon, Ms. Griffiths-Rast asserts that her products
liability claim against Sulzer Spine was tolled by her
inability to discover the identity of the BAK Cage
manufacturer prior to her meeting with Dr. Prasad on
October 4, 2002.
"Generally, [*12] the question of when a plaintiff
knew, or with reasonable diligence should have known,
of a cause of action is a question of fact for the jury."
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McCollin v. Synthes Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1123 (D.
Utah 1999). However, this determination can be made as
a matter of law when the evidence is such that no issue of
material fact exists. Id. "What constitutes due diligence
'must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case. It
is that diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the
end sought and which is reasonably calculated to do so.'"
Aragon, 857 P.2d at 253 (citations omitted).
Ms. Griffiths-Rast offers no evidence to suggest that
she made the required due diligence inquiry to determine
the manufacturer of the BAK Cage prior to meeting with
Dr. Prasad. She argues that an affidavit of her counsel's
paralegal, Jason Jensen, indicates that the nurse paralegal
he contracted with to research the claims against Dr.
Prasad provided internet literature for the LT-Cage rather
than the BAK Cage and that, because of this, they were
led to believe the LT-Cage was the device used.
However, this does not demonstrate "due diligence."
While Ms. Griffiths-Rast knew the name of the device
implanted [*13] in her spine prior to her surgery, and
she retained counsel to pursue her claim within a couple
of weeks of the surgery, neither she nor her counsel
undertook any effort to identify the BAK Cage
manufacturer prior to meeting with Dr. Prasad. "The
discovery rule does not allow plaintiffs to delay filing
suit until they have ascertained every last detail of their
claims." McCollin, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1124; see also
McKinnon, 815 F. Supp. at 421. "All that is required [to
trigger the statute of limitations] is . . . sufficient
information to apprise [the plaintiffs of the underlying
cause of action] so as to put them on notice to make
further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions" about
the defendant's actions. McCollin, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1124
(quoting United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park
City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993)). [*14]
Because Ms. Griffiths-Rast had sufficient information
immediately after her surgery to put her on notice that
she may have a cause of action against the manufacturer
of the BAK Cage, and she did not exercise due diligence
in discovering the name of the manufacturer, her claim
against Sulzer-Spine was not tolled by her failure to
discover its identity.

Sulzer Spine is a foreign corporation and, at the time of
Ms. Griffiths-Rast's surgery, did not have a registered
agent in Utah pursuant to Utah Code section 78-27-21, it
is not entitled to assert a statute of limitations defense.
However, the case cited by Ms. Griffiths-Rast to support
this assertion expressly rejected this argument. See
Claws on v. Boston Acme Mines Development Co., 72
Utah 137, 269 P. 147 (1928). The plaintiffs in Clawson
argued that because the defendant failed to comply with
Utah law authorizing foreign corporations to conduct
business in Utah, it was not entitled to use a statute of
limitations defense. Id at 151. The Utah Supreme Court
rejected this argument [*15] and held that foreign
corporations may assert a statue of limitations defense
even if the corporation failed to register an agent or
otherwise comply with statutes governing foreign
corporations. Id. at 151-52. The court further stated that
under the applicable Utah statute, a foreign corporation is
only barred from "prosecuting or maintaining any action,
suit, counterclaim, or cross-complaint in any court of the
state. It does not prohibit such corporation from
defending an action brought against it." Id. at 152. The
court concluded that "[t]here is no condition tolling the
statute [of limitations] as to foreign corporations." Id.
Therefore, Sulzer Spine's status as a foreign corporation
did not toll the statute of limitations, and Ms. GriffithsRast's claim is untimely. Accordingly, Sulzer Spine's
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment [docket # 54 and docket # 58] are GRANTED.
Because there are no remaining claims against any
Defendants, this action is hereby DISMISSED.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2005.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Dale A. Kimball
DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District [*16] Judge

Ms. Griffiths-Rast also asserts that her claim against
Sulzer Spine was tolled by its status as a foreign
corporation. Specifically, she contends that because
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OPINION
[*791]
ORDER AND JUDGMENT'

and

*
After examining the briefs and appellate
record, this panel has determined unanimously
that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed R App. P.
34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir.
R.32.L
[**2] Plaintiff-appellant Valerie Ann Griffiths-Rast
appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to
defendants-appellees Sulzer Spine Tech (Sulzer) and
Praveen G. Prasad, M.D. Ms. Griffiths-Rast underwent a
back surgery on August 3, 1998, during which Dr. Prasad
implanted a "BAK Cage" manufactured by Sulzer into
Ms. Griffiths-Rast's spine. Ms. Griffiths-Rast
subsequently served Dr, Prasad with a notice of intent to
commence action on November 26, 2001, and filed her
complaint on November 26,2002, alleging a violation by
Dr. Prasad, of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 through 78-14-16 (1998),
and a violation by Sulzer of the Utah Product Liability
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-1 through 78-15-6 (1998).
The district court granted summary judgment to Dr.
Prasad on the ground [*792] that the claim against him
was barred by the two-year statute of limitation found in
§ 78-14-4(1) and that the limitation period in that statute
was not tolled by application of 78-12-35. The district
court granted summary judgment to Sulzer on the ground
that the claim against it was barred by the two-year
statute of limitation [**3] found in § 78-15-3. Ms.
Griffiths-Rast appealed, and we exercise our jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
A. Standard of Review
"We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used
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by the district court." Simms v. Okla. ex rel Dep't of
Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d
1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a summary judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). A statute of limitation defense is an affirmative
defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Where a defendant
seeks summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative
defense,
[t]he defendant . . . must demonstrate
that no disputed material fact exists
regarding the affirmative defense asserted.
If the defendant meets this initial burden,
the plaintiff must then demonstrate [**4]
with specificity the existence of a disputed
material fact. If the plaintiff fails to make
such a showing, the affirmative defense
bars his claim, and the defendant is then
entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law.

Hutchinson v. Pfeilf 105 F.3d 562t 564 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted).
B. Claim Against Dr. Prasad
Under §78-14-8:
No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be initiated unless and
until the plaintiff gives the prospective
defendant or his executor or successor, at
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to
commence an action.

Ms. Griffiths-Rast served Dr. Prasad a notice of intent to
commence action on November 26, 2001. The district
court granted Dr. Prasad summary judgment on the
ground that the two-year malpractice statute of limitation
barred Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claim because she should
have discovered her legal injury prior to November 26,
1999. It further held that the limitation period was not
tolled by any periods of time during which Dr. Prasad
was absent from the state of Utah. Ms. Griffiths-Rast
argues that the grant of summary judgment was improper
because a reasonable jury could [**5] have found (1)
that the two-year statute of limitation should not have
begun to run until July 2, 2001, the date she claims she
discovered her legal injury, and (2) that the limitation
period was tolled by § 78-12-35.
1. Discovery of Legal Injury

Under § 78-14-4(1):
No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the injury, whichever
first occurs, but not to exceed four years
after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence.

The two-year statute of limitation in this section begins
to run when "the injured person knew or should have
known that [she] had sustained an injury and that the
injury was caused by negligent action." Foil v. Ballinger,
601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). "[Discovery of legal
injury, therefore, encompasses both awareness of
physical injury and knowledge that the injury is or may
be attributable to negligence." Collins v. Wilson, 1999
UT 56, 984 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1999) (quotation
omitted). "[A]ll that is [*793] required [**6] to trigger
the statute of limitations is sufficient information to put
plaintiff[] on notice to make further inquiry if [she]
harbors doubts or questions." Macris v. Sculptured
Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, 24 P.3d 984, 990 (Utah
2001).
Ms. Griffiths-Rast testified in her deposition that
"immediately after the [August 3, 1998, surgical]
procedure," while she was still in the hospital recovering,
she felt that there was a problem with the cage
implantation, and there was a problem with what Dr.
Prasad did, and that "[everything went wrong." Aplt.
App., Vol. 1 at 77-78, 80. Ms. Griffiths-Rast also
testified that she contacted a lawyer about the problems
with her back surgery "a couple of weeks after [her]
surgery" when she "wasn't getting any better," and that
she signed an agreement retaining the attorney's services
at that time. Id. at 104. Further, on November 10, 1998,
another doctor informed Ms. Griffiths-Rast that there
was a defect with the cage implantation. Id., Vol. 2 at
204-05, 210. Ms. Griffiths-Rast produced no evidence in
response to Dr. Prasad's summary judgment motion to
refUte these facts, admitting that she had discovered
[**7] the malpractice in November 1998. See Aplt.
App., Vol. 2 at 210.'
1 The argument presented in her response was
that she discovered the malpractice in November
1998. See Aplt. App. at 210.
Nevertheless, Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues that she did
not discover her legal injury until July 2, 2001, when she
received a report from a Dr. Stephen Wood stating that
he had been told by the Utah Malpractice Insurance
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association that "there have been numerous malpractice
suits filed due to complications resulting from The Cage'
• . . [and that he] ha[d] been told that the procedure is no
longer recommended." Aplt. App. at 200. Ms. GriffithsRast argues that the determination of when she
discovered her legal injury is a factual question not
suitable for summary judgment.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast misinterprets the summary
judgment standard. The question is whether there is a
"genuine issue as to any material fact," Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c) (emphasis added), and "an issue of [**8] material
fact is genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such
that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the
nonmovant," Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933,
935, 150 Fed. Appx. 819 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, no
reasonable jury could find that Ms. Griffiths-Rast did not
have sufficient information to put her on notice to
conduct a further inquiry into whether there was
malpractice until after November 26, 1999. In fact, she
admitted that she believed that there was something
wrong with Dr. Smith's performance immediately after
the August 1998 surgery and that she hired an attorney a
couple of weeks later to conduct an inquiry into possible
malpractice.
2. Tolling of Statute of Limitation
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues in the alternative that even
if she was aware of her legal injury prior to November
26, 1999, the limitation period should have been tolled
for some of that time because (1) Dr. Prasad conducted
business outside of Utah for periods of time between her
surgery and September 2000, and (2) Dr. Prasad moved
from Utah to California in September 2000. Under § 7812-35:
Where a cause of action accrues against
a person when he is out of the state, the
action may [**9] be commenced within
the term as limited by this chapter after
his return to the state. If after a cause of
action accrues he departs from the state,
[*794] the time of his absence is not part
of the time limited for the commencement
of the action.

Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues that it is a disputed genuine
issue of fact whether Dr. Prasad was absent for enough
time so that tolling the statute of limitation for that period
of time would result in the statue not being violated. She
argues that the district court should have conducted a
separate trial to decide this issue.
The district court held that medical malpractice
actions were excepted from the tolling provision of § 7812-35 because under § 78-14-4(2) the two-year limitation
period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority

or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any
other provision of the law." (emphasis added). The court
held that this provision was an "explicit exception to
section 78-12-35" and that the limitation period was not
tolled during Dr. Prasad's absences. We agree.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues on appeal that the tolling
provision in § 78-12-35 is applicable despite the
language in § 78-14-4(2). [**10] She first directs us to
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 n.3 (Utah
1997). In that footnote, the Utah Supreme Court noted
that the family of a woman who allegedly died of
malpractice argued that they should be able to file her
suit outside the two-year statute of limitation because
under §78-12-37:
[I]f a person entitled to bring an action
dies before the expiration of the time
limited for the commencement thereof,
and the cause of action survives, an action
may be commenced by [her]
representatives after the expiration of that
time and within one year from [her] death.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled against the family on the
ground that the statute of limitation had run prior to the
woman's death. Jensen therefore does not support Ms.
Griffiths-Rast's argument. A ruling that § 78-12-37 did
not apply because the limitation period expired prior to
the decedent's death, is not the same as ruling that § 7812-37 wowWhave applied if the limitation period had not
expired. There is no indication that the court even
considered the effect of § 78-14-4(2) on § 78-12-37.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast also argues that the Utah Supreme
[**11]
Court found that § 78-14-4(2) was
unconstitutional as applied to minors. In Lee v. Gaufin,
867 P.2d 572, 580-81 (Utah 1993), the court found that §
78-14-4(2) created an exception to § 78-12-36, which
generally tolls limitation periods as to claims of minors
until the minor reaches the age of majority. Since Ms.
Griffiths-Rast's brief does no more than note that Lee
found § 78-14-4(2) unconstitutional in that it nullified §
78-12-36, we can only assume that she is asserting,
without argument, that it is also unconstitutional when
applied to nullify to § 78-12-35. We disagree.
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in Lee was
premised on the fact that, since minors had no legal
capacity to sue in Utah, application of § 78-14-4(2) in
some cases would result in the statute of limitation
running prior to the minor coming of age and being
legally able to bring his or her action. Lee, 867 P.2d at
580. Consequently, application of § 78-14-4(2) would
deprive some minors of access to the court system. Id.
Here, there is no such problem. Considering the
provisions of Fed. R Civ. P. 4(e), Utah R. Civ. P. 4
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|**12] , and Utah's long-arm statute, § 78-27-24, 2 it is
clear [*795] that a potential defendant's flight to another
state will not immunize him from suit. Dr. Prasad was
Jiimself served with process after he moved to California.

suitable age and discretion there
residing, or by delivering a copy
of the summons and the complaint
to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive
service of process[.]

2 Under Fed R Civ. P. 4(e):
Unless otherwise provided by
federal law, service upon an
individual from whom a waiver
has not been obtained and filed . . .
may be effected in any judicial
district of the United States:
(1) pursuant to the law of the
state in which the district court is
located, or in which service is
effected, for the service of a
summons upon the defendant in an
action brought in the courts of
general jurisdiction of the State; or
(2) by delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to
the individual personally or by
leaving copies thereof at the
individual's dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein or
by delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to
an a g e n t a u t h o r i z e d by
appointment or by law to receive
service of process.

Under the pertinent parts of Utah R. Civ. P.
4(d)(1):
(d)(1) Personal service. The
summons and complaint may be
served in any state or judicial
district of the United States
If
the person to be served refuses to
accept a copy of the process,
service shall be sufficient if the
person serving the same shall state
the name of the process and offer
to deliver a copy thereof. Personal
service shall be made as follows:
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual
. . . by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the
individual personally, or by
leaving a copy at the individual's
dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of

Under the pertinent parts of § 78-27-24:
Any person . . . whether or not a
citizen or resident of [Utah], who
in person or through an agent does
any of the following enumerated
acts, submits himself, and if an
i n d i v i d u a l , his
personal
representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of [Utah] as to any
claim arising out of or related to:
(1) the transaction of any
business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply
services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury
within this state whether tortious
or by breach of warranty;

[**13]
3 Ms. Griffiths-Rast also raises a brief argument
that under § 78-14-8 she was entitled to a 120-day
enlargement of the four-year limitation period
imposed by the statute of repose found in § 7814-4(1). This argument is meritless. First, the
district court held that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's action
was barred under the malpractice act's two-year
statute of limitation, not the four-year statute of
repose. Second, under § 78-14-8, a malpractice
action may not be commenced unless the
prospective defendant is given notice of the
plaintiffs intent to commence an action at least
ninety days prior to the filing of the suit. If the
notice is served "less than ninety days prior to the
expiration of the applicable time period, the time
for commencing the malpractice action against
the health care provider shall be extended to 120
days from the date of service of the notice." Id.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast served her notice of intent in
November of 2001. Ms. Griffiths-Rast admitted
that she discovered her legal injury in November
of 1998. Therefore, even if the date that she
admitted discovery is used, the two-year statute
of limitation period ran in November 2000, a year
prior to the filing of her notice.
[**14] C. Claim Against Sulzer
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Under § 78-15-3, a legal action under the Utah
Product Liability Act: "shall be brought within two years
from the time the individual who would be the claimant
in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due
diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its
cause." The Utah Court of Appeals has held that because
the statute of limitation in § 78-15-3 runs from the time
the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered both
the harm and its "cause," the reference to "cause" in that
section "tolls the running of the statute of limitation until
the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence
should have discovered, the identity of the
manufacturer." Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857
P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Because Ms.
Griffiths-Rast did not file her complaint until November
26, 2002, [*796] her claim is barred unless she did not
discover, or in the exercise of due diligence should not
have discovered, that the BAK Cage had injured her and
that Sulzer manufactured the BAK Cage until after
November 26,2000.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast testified that she felt as if there
was a problem with the cage implantation while [**15]
she was in the hospital immediately after her surgery on
August 3, 1998; that the BAK Cage hurt and "felt" like it
was "defective"; and that she had been able to feel that
the BAK Cage was defective since its implantation. Aplt.
App., Vol. 1 at 80-81, 101-02. Because all that is
required to start the running of the limitation period is
information sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice to
make further inquiry," Maoris, 24 P.3d at 990, we don't
believe a reasonable jury could find that Ms. GriffithsRast should not have discovered with the exercise of due
diligence that the BAK Cage had injured her until after
November 26,2000.
The more difficult question is whether, as a matter of
law, through the exercise of due diligence, she should
have discovered that Sulzer was the manufacturer of the
BAK Cage prior to November 26, 2000. The district
court correctly noted in another case that "[generally, the
question of when a plaintiff knew, or with reasonable
diligence should have known, of a cause of action is a
question of fact for the jury." McCollin v. Synthes Inc.,
50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1123 (D. Utah 1999). As noted
above, however, the relevant [**16] question is whether
there is a ''genuine issue as to any material fact," Fed. R
Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added), and "an issue of material
fact is genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such
that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the
nonmovant," Garrison, 428 F.3d at 935. The district
court held that no reasonable jury could find that Ms.
Griffiths-Rast had exercised due diligence in discovering
that Sulzer was the manufacturer of the BAK Cage, and
that "her claim against Sulzer-Spine was not tolled by her
failure to discover its identity." Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 361.
On appeal, Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues again that she

did not discover that she had a legal injury until July 2,
2001, when Dr. Wood's letter told her about other
malpractice claims that had been raised. Once she
discovered that she had a legal injury, she "first
commenced the medical malpractice portion of her suit
before proceeding with the products liability aspect" of
her suit. Br. of Aplt. at 35. She alleges that she did not
begin her product liability case at the same time as her
medical malpractice case because "she needed
confirmation from [**17] Dr. Prasad [regarding] who
the manufacturer was." Id. She argues that given the
"fact" that she did not discover her legal injury until July
2, 2001, and that she did not discover that Sulzer
manufactured the BAK Cage until October 4, 2002, "[a]
reasonable jury [could] find . . . that she did not
reasonably discovery [sic] the name of the manufacturer
of the BAKTM Cage until October 2002." Br. of Aplt. at
39-40.
We disagree. As properly noted by die district court,
"[w]hat constitutes due diligence must be tailored to fit
the circumstances of each case. It is that diligence which
is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is
reasonably calculated to do so." Aragon, 857 P.2d at 253
(quotation omitted). It seems clear that in a normal case a
reasonable jury could not find that it would take over two
years to determine the manufacturer of a trademarked
medical device when the party knows the correct name of
that device. 4 [*797] The question then becomes
whether Ms. Griffiths-Rast presented evidence that
would allow a reasonable jury to find that even if she had
used "diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the
end sought and which is reasonably [**18] calculated to
do so," Aragon, 857 P.2d at 253, she should not have
ascertained the identity of the manufacturer prior to
November 26, 2000. She presented no such evidence.
4 Sulzer presented the consent form signed by
Mr. Griffiths-Rast showing that she was going to
have spinal fusion surgery with "BAK cages."
Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 332, 341. In Ms. GriffithsRast's appellate brief, she notes that one of the
"assumptions" that she had made, that Dr. Prasad
eventually corrected, was that the "BAK" in BAK
Cage was a typographical error for the word
"back."Br.ofAplt.at35.
In fact, Ms. Griffiths-Rast presented the district
court with the affidavit of a paralegal that worked for her
attorney to help explain why it had taken four years to
determine the manufacturer of the BAK Cage. The
paralegal averred that the firm had contracted with an
outside "nurse paralegal" who "was employed to research
the claims against the doctor." Aplt. App. at 316.
According to the affiant, the nurse paralegal "provided
[**19] some internet literature" for a "LT-Cage," and
that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's attorney was "led to believe that
the LT-Cage was a recently approved Cage from the
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same manufacturer of the BAK Cage." Id. According to
Ms. Griffiths-Rast, she and her attorney went to the
October 2002 meeting with Dr. Prasad, "with literature
concerning a the [sic] LT-Cage product manufactured by
different [sic] company believing that was the product
implanted into her," and Dr. Prasad informed them that
they had the wrong device.
Consequently, the evidence presented to the district
court did not show that because of the circumstances of
the case a reasonable jury could have found that with the
exercise of due diligence she should not have discovered
that Sulzer manufactured the BAK Cage until after
November 26, 2000. It showed instead that because the
outside nurse paralegal led her attorney to the
misunderstanding that die "LT-Cage" and the BAK Cage
were made by the same company, she misidentified the
manufacturer and proceeded under that misidentification
until the October 2002 meeting with Dr. Prasad.
It is true that Ms. Griffiths-Rast noted in the district

court that Sulzer had gone through a [**20] number of
company name changes and was a foreign corporation
without a registered agent in Utah. She made no
argument, however, that these facts impeded her ability
to identify Sulzer as the manufacturer of the BAK Cage.
Consequently, we see no error in the district court's grant
of summary judgment on this issue.
D. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the district court's
grant of summary judgment to Dr. Prasad and Sulzer is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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OPINION
Appellant Lorna McFadden appeals from a judgment
entered after a jury found that the statute of limitations
barred appellant's medical malpractice action against
respondents Hector Battifora, M.D., and Jeffrey
Medeiros, M.D. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Certain facts are not in dispute. In May 1997,
appellant Lorna McFadden went to see her doctor, Tadao
Fujiwara, M.D., to investigate a lump in her left breast.
Dr. Fujiwara ordered a mammogram and [*2] biopsy.
After the biopsy, a nurse from Dr. Fujiwara's office

1 There was a dispute of fact concerning the
location of the lump felt in 1999, and whether it
was in the same location as the lump felt in 1997.
In February 2000, appellant contacted a lawyer. The
complaint for medical malpractice was filed on
December 19, 2000, naming respondents, among others.2
It was proceeded [*3] by the "Notice of Intent to
Commence Action" required by statute whenever suit is
brought against a health care provider. (See Code Civ.
Proc, § 364, subd. (a).) The notice was served October
13,2000.
2 Due to the truncated nature of the proceedings,
there is no evidence in the record explaining how
respondents were involved in appellant's medical
care. Dr. Medeiros is described in the briefs as a
former pathologist for the City of Hope who
diagnosed the tissue sample from the 1997 biopsy
as non-cancerous.
Several defendants, including respondents herein,
sought a bifurcated trial on the statute of limitations as
permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 597.5. 3
Trial commenced on the statute of limitations defense.
The only witness called was appellant herself. After
hearing her testimony and reviewing certain medical
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records introduced as exhibits, the jury answered the
following questions in the affirmative: "Did [appellant]
suspect, prior [*4] to October 13, 1999, that the alleged
misdiagnosis was caused by someone's wrongdoing?"
and "Would a reasonable person have suspected, prior to
October 13, 1999, that the alleged misdiagnosis was
caused by someone's wrongdoing?"
3
Section 597.5 provides that "in an action
against a physician" and other types of
professional health care providers "based upon
the person's alleged professional negligence" if a
statute of limitations defense is raised and either
party so moves, "the issues raised thereby must
be tried separately and before any other issues in
the case are tried."
Following the verdict, the parties briefed the issue of
whether the limitations statute should have been tolled
with respect to Dr. Medeiros due to his absence from the
state since May 1998, when he moved to Texas to take a
new job. The court ruled that there was no basis for
tolling, and judgment was entered in favor of respondents
on July 8, 2002. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I
The parties agree that the governing [*5] statute of
limitations is found in Code of Civil Procedure section
340.5, which provides in relevant part: "In an action for
injury or death against a health care provider based upon
such person's alleged professional negligence, the time
for the commencement of action shall be three years after
the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first." As
explained in Kitzig v. Nordquist (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
1384, 1391, this statute "sets forth two alternate tests for
triggering the limitations period: (1) a subjective test
requiring actual suspicion by the plaintiff that the injury
was caused by wrongdoing; and (2) an objective test
requiring a showing that a reasonable person would have
suspected the injury was caused by wrongdoing.
[Citation.] The first to occur under these two tests begins
the limitations period."
Appellant contends that the essence of the
underlying statute of limitations defense was that
appellant "should have known, sometime between
August 10 and October 13, 1999, that she was
misdiagnosed in 1997, because [*6] Dr. Fujiwara's nurse
told her in that year that she had cancer" and that
respondents' position "rests solely on the belief that the
nurse's comment — corrected by her physician hours later
— should have triggered a suspicion of wrongdoing two
years later." Selectively quoting from closing argument,
appellant implies that this fact was "the linchpin of

[respondents']
defense."

affirmative

[statute

of

limitations]

Appellant misperceives the evidence that supported
the jury's findings. The evidence demonstrated that
appellant went to see Dr. Fujiwara about a lump in her
left breast in May 1997. He ordered a mammogram and
biopsy and, having received the results and consulted
with other physicians, told her she did not have cancer.
Two years later, in the summer of 1999, a new doctor
diagnosed cancer in the same breast. Appellant
underwent a mastectomy in September 1999. That is the
point at which a reasonable person should have been
suspicious of the original diagnosis of no cancer. Yet
appellant did not submit the required statutory notice to
her health care providers until October 2000, more than a
year later.4
4 If the statutory notice is submitted within the
last 90 days of the limitations period, it extends or
tolls the statute for up to 90 days depending on
the precise day it was served within the
limitations period. (Code Civ. Proc, § 364, subd.
(d); Davis v. Marin (2000) 80 Cal App. 4th 380,
385.)
[*7]
The significance of the call from Dr.
Fujiwara's nurse was not that it should have made
appellant immediately suspicious of her doctor's 1997
diagnosis. A patient is entitled to believe reassuring news
from her doctor or another physician. In Kitzig v.
Nordquist, supra, for example, the patient sought a
second medical opinion and was assured in 1994 that she
was being treated appropriately. She brought suit in
1996, within a year of being told by other physicians that
something was going wrong. The court held that she was
not obligated to bring suit within one year of her initial
suspicion since a patient should not be "placed in the
position of conducting a full investigation" to determine
whether litigation is appropriate after "the second doctor
confirms that the first doctor is doing everything right."
(81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.)
To a similar effect is the decision in Artal v. Allen
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, discussed in appellant's
reply brief. There, appeal was taken from a judgment in
favor of defendant based on a statute of limitations
defense after the initial phase of a bifurcated nonjury
trial. The facts indicated that [*8] plaintiff awoke after
pelvic surgery in May 1998 with severe and persistent
throat pain. Plaintiff saw at least 20 specialists in the next
18 months and was given numerous conflicting
diagnoses. In May 1999, she stated on a medical form
that she believed her continuing pain was due to "some
sort of trauma [that was] caused during intubation [for
anesthesia during the surgery]." (Id. at p. 276, italics
omitted.) In November 1999, plaintiff underwent
exploratory surgery and was told that there was a fracture
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in her thyroid cartilage, but not that it was or may have
been caused by the intubation during the 1998 surgery.
Nevertheless, the diagnosis caused plaintiff to attribute
the fracture to the intubation. She filed her complaint
against the anesthesiologist on October 27, 2000. The
Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence did not
support the finding that plaintiff knew, or by reasonable
diligence should have known, that her throat pain was
caused by professional negligence until the 1999
exploratory surgery. The court noted that "[plaintiff] was
a model of diligence" in that "she consulted at least 20
specialists in the 18 months following the May 8, 1998,
surgery" [*9] and "was given some two dozen possible
diagnoses, including tonsil infection, cancer, lupus,
emotional and/or mental problems and asthma." {Id. at p.
281.) Because "the necessary facts could not be
ascertained without exploratory surgery" and diligence
did not require plaintiff to immediately resort to surgery,
the court could not agree that plaintiffs claim was
untimely. {Ibid.)
Appellant here admits that her suspicions of
negligence were aroused after the 1999 diagnosis of
cancer as soon as Dr. Fujiwara's diagnosis of no cancer
in the same breast crossed her mind. To support her
position that she did not have any misgivings prior to
February 2000, she testified that the earlier diagnosis was
driven from her head by the 1999 cancer diagnosis,
surgery, and followup chemotherapy treatments, and that
she "never thought about" the 1997 diagnosis until
February 2000 when she was "reminded" of it by a
friend. The nurse's call was significant because it cast
doubt on appellant's testimony that she did not think
about the 1997 diagnosis until February 2000. In
response to appellant's theory, counsel for respondents
argued in closing: "There are certain things in your [*10]
life that you never forget. Being told you have cancer,
thinking your are going to die, having the dark cloud
surround you as [appellant] talked about, having the light
shine back upon you, you never forget." Counsel further
pointed out that appellant had been able to provide the
doctors in Las Vegas with the names of her prior
physicians and releases so that they could obtain her
medical records, and told them about the prior biopsy.
On those facts, the jury was entitled to believe that
appellant was being untruthful when she claimed to have
forgotten the traumatic occasion on which she was
initially told she had breast cancer and then, a few hours
later, told she did not. Accordingly, the jury had ample
ground to believe that appellant's suspicion of
wrongdoing was or should have been aroused in the
summer of 1999, when she was diagnosed with cancer by
the Las Vegas doctors and suffered the removal of her
left breast.
II
The remaining issue has to do with tolling under

section 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure {section 351)
which provides in relevant part: "If, when the cause of
action accrues against a person, he is out of the State, the
action [*11] may be commenced within the term herein
limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause
of action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of
his absence is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action." 5 Because Dr. Medeiros
moved to Texas in May 1998, prior to the accrual of the
one-year statute of limitations, appellant maintains that
the statute has not run as to him. 6
5 Despite its language, courts have held that a
defendant "need not 'enter' or 'return' to the state
in order for the plaintiff to commence an action
which takes advantage of the tolling provisions of
section 357." {Green v. Zissis (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 1219, 1223.) In 1979, the California
Supreme Court held that the modern availability
of alternate methods of service in place of
personal delivery of a summons and complaint,
such as substituted service and service by
publication, had no impact on section 35 Vs
continued viability. {Dew v. Appleberry (1979) 23
Cal.3d630, 634-636, 153 CaL Rptr. 219.)
6 Appellant devotes a considerable portion of
her brief to the issue of whether section 351 can
ever be applied to toll the one-year medical
malpractice limitations period due to a restriction
on tolling found in Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.5. Respondents concede that it can.
[*12] In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises (1988) 486 U.S. 888, 100 L. Ed. 2d 896, the
United States Supreme Court held that an Ohio tolling
statute similar to section 351 unnecessarily burdened
interstate commerce because it barred foreign
corporations from asserting a statute of limitations
defense unless they maintained a presence in Ohio, but
served no weighty state interest due to the fact that
Ohio's long-arm statute permitted service on foreign
corporations at any time. Bendix was applied to section
351 by the Ninth Circuit in Abramson v. Brownstein (9th
Cir. 1990) 897 F.2d 389, which involved a
Massachusetts resident who had entered into an
agreement with two California residents. The California
residents sued for breach of contract and fraud long after
the fact, and relied on section 351 to establish that
otherwise applicable statutes of limitations had been
tolled. The Ninth Circuit held that applying section 351
to the situation would impermissibly burden interstate
commerce, reasoning that "[section 351] forces a
nonresident individual engaged in interstate commerce to
choose between being present in California for several
[*13] years or forfeiture of the limitations defense,
remaining subject to suit in California in perpetuity." {Id.
at p. 392.)
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In Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th
1276, this court considered whether section 351 was
constitutionally sound when its provisions were applied
to a California resident engaged in interstate commerce.
In Filet Menu, California resident Warren Cheng was
sued for breach of contract and other related claims. The
complaint alleged that Cheng was absent from California
for periods sufficient to toll the running of the applicable
statutory period, but did not allege the specific reasons
for Cheng's out-of-state travel. We concluded that
"section 351 imposes a special burden on residents who
travel in the course of interstate commerce that is not
shared by residents involved solely in 'local business and
trade . » . .'" (Id. at p. 1282, quoting Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, supra, 486 U.S. at p.
891.) "Residents engaged in interstate commerce often
travel outside the state to facilitate this activity, unlike
residents who are otherwise occupied or employed. Thus,
section [*14] 351 poses a hard choice to residents who
engage in interstate commerce and who face potential
liability arising out of this economic activity that section
351 does not pose to other residents. Residents occupied
in interstate commerce must curtail their travel outside
the state in the course of interstate commerce to avoid the
tolling provisions of section 351, or endure extended
exposure to litigation because of their travel in the course
of interstate commerce." (Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng,
supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283.) At the same time, we
found no state interest to outweigh this burden since
"residents are equally subject to service, regardless of
their reasons for traveling out of state." (Ibid.)
We found support for our conclusion in the case of
Tesar v. Hallas (N.D. Ohio 1990) 738 F. Supp. 240, in
which the court had held that "interstate commerce is
affected when persons move between states in the course
of or in search for employment" in applying Bendix to a

case involving a defendant who had moved from Ohio to
Pennsylvania to take a new job. Relying on numerous
cases that held that interstate commerce is impacted
when persons [*15] move between states to search for
employment (id. at p. 242, and cases cited therein), the
court concluded that there was no justification in forcing
people to chose between an out-of-state job and enjoying
the protections of the various statutes of limitations when
Ohio's long-arm statute provided jurisdiction over all
those alleged to have engaged in wrongful activity in the
state (ibid.).
We see no reason to depart from the views expressed
in Filet Menu. Dr. Medeiros, a former California
resident, moved to Texas to take a new job in 1998,
thereby engaging in interstate commerce. He has been
fully amenable to service under California's long-arm
statute since that time. There is no sound basis for
imposing a burden on him that would not have been
imposed had he remained a California resident, or
forcing him to choose between a new job in a different
state and unlimited exposure to litigation arising from his
work in California. Under Bendix, section 351 cannot be
used to toll the otherwise applicable statute of
limitations.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CURRY, J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, J., Acting P.J.
HASTINGS, J.

